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GEOMETRY ON THE UTILITY SPACE∗
François Durand†
Benoît Kloeckner‡
Fabien Mathieu§
Ludovic Noirie§
March 20, 2014
We examine the geometrical properties of the space of expected utilities over a
finite set of options, which is commonly used to model the preferences of an agent. We
focus on the case where options are assumed to be symmetrical a priori. Specifically,
we prove that the only Riemannian metric that respects the geometrical properties
and the natural symmetries of the utility space is the round metric.
JEL code: D81.
I Introduction
I.A Motivation
In order to represent an agent’s preferences over options in a context of un-
certainty, a simple and elegant model was formally defined by Von Neumann
et Morgenstern: expected utilities. For any agent, a numerical utility is associ-
ated to each option; the utility of a lottery over the options is computed as an
expected value. See Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944); Fishburn (1970);
Kreps (1990); Mas-Colell et al. (1995).
For a great deal of applications, options are financial rewards or quantities
of one or several goods. As a consequence, there is a natural structure over the
space of options: the structure of the real line or Rm, at least as a topological,
or even metrical, vector space. In such cases, it is natural to study, for exam-
ple, possible derivatives of the utility with respect to the reward: monotony,
concavity or convexity (risk attitude), etc.
However, for some other applications, such as voting systems, options can
be, for example, candidates for a position or possible decisions about a given
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question. Without additional information, we may consider that options are
symmetrical a priori. In that case, to the best of our knowledge, little attention
has been paid to the geometrical properties of the utility space.
Under the assumptions of Von Neumann–Morgenstern theorem (that will be
recalled), an agent’s utility vector is defined up to two constants; choosing a
specific normalization is arbitrary. In particular, utilities of two distinct agents
are essentially incomparable without an additional normalization assumption.
Geometrically, the utility space has the properties of a projective space.
A priori, this space has no natural metric. It is a pity, because it is generally
convenient to work in a space with as much structure as possible. More specifi-
cally, with a metric, it is quite easy to endow the space with various probability
laws, in order to model the “culture” of a population. In this paper, our goal is
to give a better geometrical understanding of the utility space and to show the
limited ways of endowing it with a natural metric.
I.B Contributions
Firstly, we investigate various geometrical properties of the utility space:
• We show that the utility space has a projective structure and may be
seen as a quotient of the dual of the space of pairs of lotteries over the
candidates;
• We naturally define an inversion operation, that corresponds to reversing
preferences while keeping their intensities, and a summation operation,
that is proved to preserve unanimous preferences;
• We remark that the utility space has a pathological topology when keeping
the indifference point but a spherical topology when removing it.
Secondly, since the utility space is a variety, it is a natural wish to endow
it with a Riemannian metric. We show that the only Riemannian representa-
tion that preserves the natural projective properties and the a priori symmetry
between the candidates is the round metric.
I.C Plan
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Von Neumann–Morgenstern
theorem is recalled in section II. Several properties of this model are studied:
duality with the space of pairs of lotteries in section III, inversion and summation
operators in section IV, topology in section V. In section VI, it is shown what
Riemannian metrics respect the natural symmetries of this space. Finally, in
section VII, formulas are given that allow to use this spherical representation
for applications.
In the appendix, the reader will find tables recalling the main notations of
this paper.
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II Von Neumann–Morgenstern model
In this section, we define some notations and we recall Von Neumann and
Morgenstern theorem, which allows to represent an agent’s preferences over
probabilistic options by the means of an expected utility form; see Von Neumann
and Morgenstern (1944).
We first formalize the available options and lotteries over them.
Notations II.1 (candidates and lotteries). For any k ∈ N, we denote J1, kK the
integer interval from 1 to k.
Let m ∈ N \ {0} and Cm = J1,mK. Elements in Cm represent mutually
exclusive options called candidates.
Let Lm = {(L1, . . . , Lm) ∈ R+m s.t.
∑m
j=1 Lj = 1}. It is the set of lotteries
over the candidates in Cm.
For any two lotteries L = (L1, . . . , Lm) and M = (M1, . . . ,Mm), for any
α ∈ [0, 1], we naturally define their reduced compound lottery as a barycenter:
αL+ (1− α)M =
(
αL1 + (1− α)M1, . . . , αLm + (1− α)Mm
)
.
The preferences of an agent over the space of lotteries are represented by a
binary relation - over Lm. Let ≺ be the strict relation associated to -, defined
as: L ≺M ⇔ L -M and not M - L.
We also need to introduce a few additional notations.
Notations II.2 (linear algebra). We denote
−→
1 the vector whose m coordinates
are 1 and J the m×m matrix whose m2 coefficients are 1.
When E is a part of a vector space, we denote vect(E) the linear span of E.
The canonical inner product of −→u and −→v is denoted 〈−→u | −→v 〉. The canonical
Euclidean norm of −→u is denoted ‖−→u ‖.
Definition II.3 (completeness). We say that relation - is complete if and only
if ∀(L,M) ∈ Lm2:
L -M orM - L.
Definition II.4 (transitivity). We say that relation - is transitive if and only
if ∀(L,M,N) ∈ Lm3:
L -M andM - N ⇒ L - N.
Definition II.5 (archimedeanness). We say that relation - is archimedean if
and only if ∀(L,M,N) ∈ Lm3:
L ≺M andM ≺ N ⇒ ∃ε ∈ ]0, 1[ s.t. (1− ε)L+ εN ≺M ≺ εL+ (1− ε)N.
Definition II.6 (independence of irrelevant alternatives). We say that - is
independent of irrelevant alternatives if and only if ∀(L,M,N) ∈ Lm3,∀α ∈
]0, 1]:
L ≺M ⇒ αL+ (1− α)N ≺ αM + (1− α)N.
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Definition II.7 (utility vector). Let - be a binary relation over Lm. Let−→u = (u1, . . . , um) ∈ Rm.
We say that −→u is a utility vector representing - if and only, for any two
lotteries L = (L1, . . . , Lm) and M = (M1, . . . ,Mm):
L -M ⇔
m∑
j=1
Ljuj ≤
m∑
j=1
Mjuj .
Theorem II.8 (Von Neumann and Morgenstern). Let - be a binary relation
over Lm.
The following conditions are equivalent.
1. The binary relation - is complete, transitive, archimedean and indepen-
dent of irrelevant alternatives.
2. There exists −→u ∈ Rm a utility vector representing -.
When they are met, −→u is defined up to an additive constant and a positive
multiplicative constant: if −→u ∈ Rm is a utility vector representing -, then−→v ∈ Rm is a utility vector representing - if and only if ∃a ∈ ]0,+∞[,∃b ∈ R
s.t. −→v = a−→u + b−→1 .
For a proof, see Von Neumann et al. (2007), Mas-Colell et al. (1995) or Kreps
(1990).
Discussing whether completeness, transitivity and archimedeanness assump-
tions are experimentally valid is out of the scope of this paper: see Fishburn
(1988); Mas-Colell et al. (1995). Let us note that, while keeping a sheer sim-
plicity, this model is sophisticated enough to deal with relative intensities of the
agent’s preferences. This gives more information than just a total preorder over
the candidates.
Definition II.9 (utility space). Let ≈ be the equivalence relation defined by
∀(−→u ,−→v ) ∈ (Rm)2:
−→u ≈ −→v ⇔ ∃a ∈ ]0,+∞[,∃b ∈ R s.t. −→v = a−→u + b−→1 .
We call utility space over m candidates, and we denote Um, the quotient
space Rm/ ≈.
We call canonical projection from Rm to Um the function:
≈
pi :
Rm → Um−→u → {−→v ∈ Rm s.t. −→v ≈ −→u }.
For any −→u ∈ Rm and ≈u = ≈pi(−→u ), we denote without ambiguity -≈
u
the
binary relation over Lm represented by −→u in the sense of theorem II.8 (Von
Neumann–Morgenstern).
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III Duality
In this section, we remark that the utility space is a dual of the space of
pairs of lotteries. This will be especially helpful to demonstrate theorem IV.9,
characterizing the summation operator that will be defined in section IV.
In the example represented in figure I, we consider m = 3 candidates and−→u = ( 53 ;− 13 ;− 43 ). The great triangle is the space of lotteries Lm, that is,
the simplex defined by
∑
Li = 1 and ∀i, Li ≥ 0. Hatchings are the agent’s
indifference lines: she is indifferent between any pair of lotteries on the same line
(see Mas-Colell et al. (1995), section 6.B). Here, we have drawn a utility vector−→u that is in the plane of the great triangle and orthogonal to the indifference
lines. This is not mandatory, since −→u can be arbitrarily chosen in ≈u, but it is a
quite natural choice, since the component of −→u in the direction −→1 , orthogonal
to the simplex, has no meaning in terms of preferences.
L1
L2
L3
1
1
1
Lm
−→u
Figure I: Space of lotteries for 3 candidates.
The utility vector −→u may be seen as a (uniform) gradient of preference: at
each point, it reveals in what directions one can find lotteries that are preferred
by the agent. However, only the direction of −→u is important, whereas its norm
has no specific meaning; as a consequence, the utility space is not exactly a dual
space, but rather a quotient of a dual space, as we will see more formally.
Definition III.1 (bipoint). For any two lotteries L = (L1, . . . , Lm) and M =
(M1, . . . ,Mm), we call bipoint from L to M the vector in Rm:
−−→
LM = (M1 − L1, . . . ,Mm − Lm).
Definition III.2 (tangent polytope and hyperplane). We call tangent polytope
of Lm the set T of bipoints of Lm:
T = {−−→LM, (L,M) ∈ Lm2}.
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We call tangent hyperplane of Lm:
H = {(∆1, . . . ,∆m) ∈ Rm s.t.
m∑
j=1
∆j = 0}.
Remark III.3 (geometrical interpretation). In figure I, T is the set of the
bipoints of the great triangle, seen as a part of a vector space (whereas Lm is a
part of an affine space). Hyperplane H is the whole vector plan containing T .
Lemma III.4 (T generates H). ∀−→∆ ∈ H,∃−−→LM ∈ T ,∃λ ∈ ]0,+∞[ s.t. −→∆ =
λ
−−→
LM.
Proof. Polytope T contains a neighborhood of the origin in vector space H.
Definition III.5 (linear forms on H). Let H? be the dual space of H, that is,
the set of linear forms on H. Let −→u = (u1, . . . , um) ∈ Rm.
We call linear form associated to −→u the following element of H?:
〈−→u | : H → R−→
∆ = (∆1, . . . ,∆m) → 〈−→u | −→∆ 〉 =
∑m
j=1 uj∆j .
We call positive half-hyperplane associated to −→u :
−→u +H = {−→∆ ∈ H s.t. 〈−→u | −→∆ 〉 ≥ 0}.
Proposition III.6 (preferences expressed in terms of linear forms).Let (L,M) ∈
Lm2 and −→u ∈ Rm. Then:
L -≈
u
M ⇔ 〈−→u | −−→LM 〉 ≥ 0⇔ −−→LM ∈ −→u +H.
Proof. This follows easily from the definitions.
Proposition III.7 (utility space and linear forms). For any (f, g) ∈ (H?)2, we
denote f ≈ g if and only ∃a ∈ ]0,+∞[ s.t. g = af . We denote ≈pi(f) = {g ∈
H? s.t. f ≈ g}.
For any (−→u ,−→v ) ∈ (Rm)2, we have:
−→u ≈ −→v ⇔ 〈−→u | ≈ 〈−→v |.
The following application is a bijection:
Θ :
Um → H?/ ≈
≈
pi(−→u ) → ≈pi(〈−→u |).
Proof. −→u ≈ −→v
⇔ ∃a ∈ ]0,+∞[,∃b ∈ R s.t. −→v − a−→u = b−→1
⇔ ∃a ∈ ]0,+∞[ s.t. −→v − a−→u is orthogonal to H
⇔ ∃a ∈ ]0,+∞[ s.t. ∀−→∆ ∈ H, 〈−→v | −→∆ 〉 = a〈−→u | −→∆ 〉
⇔ 〈−→u | ≈ 〈−→v |.
The implication ⇒ proves that Θ is correctly defined: indeed, if ≈pi(−→u ) =
≈
pi(−→v ), then ≈pi(〈−→u |) = ≈pi(〈−→v |). The implication ⇐ ensures that Θ is injective.
Finally, Θ is obviously surjective.
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Remark III.8 (interpretation). Hence, the utility space may be seen as a
quotient of the dual H? of the tangent space H of the lotteries Lm. A utility
vector may be seen, up to a positive constant, as a linear form over H that
reveals, for any point in the space of lotteries, in what directions the agent can
find lotteries that she prefers.
IV Inversion and summation operators
As a quotient of Rm, the utility space inherits natural operations from Rm:
inversion and summation. We will see that both these quotient operators have
an intuitive meaning regarding preferences.
Definition IV.1 (inversion). In Um, the inversion operator is defined as:
− : Um → Um≈
pi(−→u ) → ≈pi(−−→u ).
Remark IV.2 (the inversion operator is a bijection). The inversion operator
is correctly defined and it is a bijection. Indeed, ≈pi(−→u ) = ≈pi(−→v ) if and only if
≈
pi(−−→u ) = ≈pi(−−→v ).
Remark IV.3 (interpretation in terms of preferences). Considering the ad-
ditive inverse amounts to reverting the agent’s preferences, without modifying
their relative intensities.
Now, we want to push the summation operator from Rm to the quotient
Um. The idea is quite simple and general: considering ≈u and ≈v in Um, their
antecedents are taken in Rm thanks to ≈pi−1, the sum is computed in Rm, then
the result is converted back into the quotient space Um, thanks to ≈pi.
However, the result is not unique. Indeed, let us take arbitrary representa-
tives −→u ∈ ≈u and −→v ∈ ≈v. In order to compute the sum, we can think of any
representatives. So, possible sums are a−→u + a′−→v + b + b′, where a and a′ are
positive and where b+ b′ is any real number.
Converting back to the quotient, we can get for example ≈pi(2−→u + −→v ) and
≈
pi(−→u + 3−→v ), which are generally distinct. As a consequence, the set of outputs
is not the utility space Um, but rather the set P(Um) of its subsets.
This example shows how we could define the sum of two elements ≈u and ≈v.
In order to be more general, we will define the sum of any number of elements
of Um. Hence we also take P(Um) as the set of inputs.
Definition IV.4 (summation). On the subsets of Um, we define the summation
operator as:∑
:
P(Um) → P(Um)
A → {≈pi (∑ni=1−→ui) , n ∈ N, (−→u1, . . . ,−→un) ∈ (≈pi−1(A))n} .
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Example IV.5 (sum of two utility vectors). Let us consider U4. In figure II, for
the purpose of visualization, we represent its projection inH, which is permitted
by the choice of normalization constants b. Since H is a 3-dimensional space,
let (
−→
h1,
−→
h2,
−→
h3) be an orthonormal base of H.
For two non-trivial utility vectors ≈u and ≈v, the choice of normalization mul-
tiplicators a allow to choose representatives −→u and −→v whose Euclidean norm
is 1.
In this representation, the sum
∑{≈u, ≈v} consists of utilities corresponding
to vectors a−→u + a′−→v , where a and a′ are nonnegative. Indeed, we took a
representation in H, so all normalization constants b vanish. Moreover, a, a′ or
both can be equal to zero because our definition allows to ignore −→u , −→v or both.
Up to taking representatives of unitary norm for non-trivial utility vectors, let
us note that the sum
∑{∼u, ∼v} can be represented by the dotted line and the
point
−→
0 of total indifference.
−→u
−→v
∑{≈u, ≈v}
−→
h1
−→
h2
−→
h3
Figure II: Sum of two utility vectors in the utility space.
Remark IV.6 (geometrical interpretation). Geometrically, the sum is the quo-
tient of the convex hull of the inputs. Note that this convex hull is actually a
convex cone. A bit later, we will see its interpretation in terms of preferences.
Remark IV.7 (closed cone). Our convention is to consider the closed cone: for
example, ≈u fits in our definition. That would not be the case if we took only
≈
pi(a−→u + a′−→v + b), where a′ > 0. In the same spirit, ≈pi(−→0 ) fits in our definition.
Generally, that would not be the case if we took only ≈pi(a−→u + a′−→v + b), where
a > 0 and a′ > 0. The stated purpose of this convention is to have a concise
wording for theorem IV.9 that follows.
Proposition IV.8 (basic properties of the sum). Let A ∈ P(Um). Then:
1. ≈pi(
−→
0 ) ∈∑A;
2. A ⊂∑A.
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Proof. 1. Consider n = 0 in the definition.
2. For ≈u ∈ A, if it sufficient to consider n = 1 and −→u1 ∈ ≈pi−1(≈u) in order to
prove that ≈u ∈∑A.
We now prove that, if A is the set of the utility vectors of a population, then∑
A is the set of utility vectors that respect the unanimous preferences of A.
Theorem IV.9 (characterization of the sum). Let A ∈ P(Um) and ≈v ∈ Um.
The following conditions are equivalent.
1. ≈v ∈∑A.
2. ∀(L,M) ∈ Lm2:
(∀≈u ∈ A,L -≈
u
M
)⇒ L -≈
v
M.
Proof. Let −→v ∈ ≈pi−1(≈v). We have the following equivalences.
• ∀(L,M) ∈ Lm2,
(∀≈u ∈ A,L -≈
u
M
)⇒ L -≈
v
M ,
• ∀−−→LM ∈ T ,
(
∀−→u ∈ ≈pi−1(A), 〈−→u | −−→LM 〉 ≥ 0
)
⇒ 〈−→v | −−→LM 〉 ≥ 0,
• ∀−→∆ ∈ H,
(
∀−→u ∈ ≈pi−1(A), 〈−→u | −→∆ 〉 ≥ 0
)
⇒ 〈−→v | −→∆ 〉 ≥ 0 (cf. lemma III.4),
• ⋂−→u∈≈pi−1(A)−→u +H ⊂ −→v +H,
• −→v is in the convex cone of ≈pi−1(A),
• ≈v ∈∑A.
Example IV.10 (a utility vector and its inverse). Let us consider a non null
≈
u and let us examine the sum of ≈u and its additive inverse −≈u. Applying the
definition, we see that the sum consists of ≈u, −≈u and ≈0.
However, we have just seen that the sum is the subset of utility vectors
preserving the unanimous preferences over lotteries. Intuitively, we could think
that, since ≈u and −≈u seem to always disagree, any utility vector ≈v respects the
empty set of their common preferences; so, their sum should be the whole space.
But this is a false assumption. For example, let us consider −→u = (1, 0, . . . , 0).
About any two lotteries L and M , inverse opinions ≈u and −≈u agree if and only
if L1 = M1: in that case, both of them are indifferent between L and M .
Hence, ≈u and −≈u do have a characteristic common feature: they pay attention
to candidate 1 only, even if their opinions about her are diverging.
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V Topology
In this section, we remark that the utility space has a pathological topology
when keeping the indifference point, but a spherical topology when removing it.
This will be used in section VI to demonstrate theorem VI.5, characterizing the
suitable Riemannian metrics.
Definition V.1 (T0 space). We say that a topological space is a T0 space or a
Kolmogorov space if and only if, for any two distinct points, at least one of them
has an open neighborhood not containing the other. See Guénard and Lelièvre
(1985).
Definition V.2 (T1 space). We say that a topological space is a T1 space if
and only if, for any two distinct points, each of them has an open neighborhood
not containing the other. See Guénard and Lelièvre (1985).
Proposition V.3 (topology of the utility space). We assume m ≥ 2. The
utility space Um = Rm/ ≈ is endowed with the quotient topology.
Um\{
≈
0} has the same topology as the sphere of dimensionm−2. In particular
it is a T1 space.
Um is a T0 space but not a T1 space.
Proof. Let Sm−2 = {−→u = (u1, . . . , um) ∈ Rm s.t.
∑m
j=1 uj = 0,
∑m
j=1 u
2
j = 1}.
Then:
Θ :
Sm−2 → Um \ {
≈
0}−→u → ≈pi(−→u )
is a homeomorphism.
In Um, the only new case concerns
≈
0 and any point ≈u 6= ≈0. Then ≈u do have
an open neighborhood not containing
≈
0. But
≈
0 has a unique open neighborhood:
Um in whole, which contains ≈u.
VI Riemannian representation
Since the utility space is a variety, it is a natural desire to endow it with a
Riemannian metric. In this section, we prove that there is a limited choice of
metrics that are coherent with the natural properties of the space and with the
a priori symmetry between the candidates.
Definition VI.1 (line). We assume that m ≥ 3. The image of a 2-dimensional
subspace of H in Um \ {
≈
0} by the canonical projection ≈pi is called a line in
Um \ {
≈
0}.
Remark VI.2 (connection with the sum operator). This notion is deeply con-
nected to the summation operator defined in section IV: indeed, the sum of
two non antipodal points in Um \ {
≈
0} is a segment of the line joining them, the
shortest one in the sense of the round metric. We will show that this property
holds true only for this metric.
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Notations VI.3 (round metric). The quotient Rm/vect(−→1 ) is identified to H
and endowed with the inner product inherited from the canonical one of Rm.
The utility space Um \ {
≈
0} is identified to the unit sphere of H and endowed
with the induced Riemannian structure. Let us call ξ0 this Riemannian metric
on Um \ {
≈
0}.
Remark VI.4 (geometrical interpretation). In order to get an intuitive vision
of this metric, one can represent any position ≈u by a vector −→u that verify:{ ∑
ui = 0,∑
u2i = 1.
We obtain a (m − 2)-dimensional sphere and we consider the metric induced
by the canonical Euclidean metric of Rm. That is, distances are measured on
the surface of the sphere, using the restriction of the canonical inner product
on each tangent space.
Let us remark that any inner product on Rm induces a Riemannian metric
on Um\{
≈
0} by the same process and that any two of these metrics are isometric;
however, they are not equal, except if these inner products are multiple of each
other. The difference between isometry and equality is essentially the same as
between two loops of equal length: there exists an application from one to the
other that preserves distances along the curve, but they are not generally equal.
We will prove that for any m ≥ 4, the spherical representation is the only
one that is coherent with the natural properties of the space and that respects
the a priori symmetry between candidates.
Theorem VI.5 (Riemannian representation of the utility space). We assume
that m ≥ 4. Let ξ be a Riemannian metric on Um \ {
≈
0}.
Conditions 1 and 2 are equivalent.
1. (a) The lines of Um \ {
≈
0} are geodesics of ξ; and
(b) for any permutation σ of J1,mK, the action Φσ induced on Um \ {≈0}
by
(u1, . . . , um)→ (uσ(1), . . . , uσ(m))
is an isometry.
2. ∃λ ∈ ]0,+∞[ s.t. ξ = λξ0.
Proof. Since the implication 2 ⇒ 1 is obvious, we now prove 1 ⇒ 2. The deep
result behind this is a classical theorem of Beltrami, which dates back to the
middle of the nineteenth century: see Beltrami (1866) and Beltrami (1869).
Beltrami’s theorem precisely tells us that condition 1a implies that Um \ {
≈
0}
has constant curvature. Note that this result is in fact more subtle in dimension
2 (that is, for m = 4) than in higher dimensions; see Spivak (1979a), Theorem
1.18 and Spivak (1979b), Theorem 7.2 for proofs.
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Since Um \ {
≈
0} is a topological sphere, this constant curvature must be pos-
itive. Up to multiplying ξ by a constant, we can assume that this constant
curvature is 1. As a consequence, there is an isometry Ψ : Sm−2 → Um \ {
≈
0},
where Sm−2 is the unit sphere of Rm−1, endowed with its usual round metric.
The function Ψ obviously maps geodesic to geodesics, and by a standard pro-
jective geometry argument there is a linear map Λ : Rm−1 → H inducing Ψ,
that is such that:
Ψ ◦Π = Π ◦ Λ,
where Π denotes both projections Rm−1 → Sm−2 and H → Um \ {
≈
0}. Using
Ψ to push the canonical inner product of Rm−1, we get that there exists an
inner product (−→u ,−→v ) → φ(−→u ,−→v ) on H that induces ξ, in the sense that ξ is
the Riemannian metric obtained by identifying Um \ {
≈
0} with the unit sphere
defined in H by φ and restricting φ to it.
The last thing to prove is that φ is the inner product coming from the
canonical one on Rm. Note that hypothesis 1b is mandatory, since any inner
product on H does induce on Um \ {
≈
0} a Riemannian metric satisfying 1a.
Each canonical basis vector −→ej = (0, . . . , 1, . . . , 0) defines a point in Um \ {
≈
0}
and a half-line `j in H. Condition 1b ensures that these half-lines are permuted
by isometries of (H, φ). In particular, there are vectors −→uj ∈ `j that have
constant pairwise distance (for φ), so that they form a regular simplex and∑
j
−→uj = −→0 . By a standard projective geometry argument, −→u1, . . . ,−−−→um−1 is
up to multiplication by a scalar the unique basis of H such that −→uj ∈ `j and∑
j<m
−→uj ∈ −`m.
Now consider the canonical inner product φ0 on H that comes from the
canonical one on Rm. Since permutations of coordinates are isometries, we get
that the vectors −→vj = Π(−→ej ) (where Π is now the orthogonal projection from
Rm to H) form a regular simplex for φ0, so that
∑
j
−→vj = −→0 . It follows that−→uj = λ−→vj for some λ > 0 and all j. We deduce that the −→uj form a regular simplex
for both φ and φ0, which must therefore be multiple from each other.
Remark VI.6 (utility space for three candidates). However, the implication
1 ⇒ 2 in the theorem is not true for m = 3. For each non null utility vector,
let us consider its representative verifying min(ui) = 0 and max(ui) = 1. This
way, Um \{
≈
0} is identified to edges of the unit cube in R3, as in figure III. Then,
Um \ {
≈
0} is endowed with the metric induced on these edges by the canonical
inner product on R3. Then conditions 1a and 1b of the theorem are met, but
not condition 2.
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u1 u2
u3
(0, 1, 1)
Figure III: A non-circular representation of the utility space for 3 candidates.
VII Riemannian representation in practice
The Riemann representation introduced in the previous section may be used
for two main purposes.
• One may want to compute distances between two utility vectors.
• Once the space is endowed with a metric, it is endowed with a natural
probability measure: the uniform measure in the sense of this metric.
Hence, one can use the uniform measure itself or define other measures by
their densities with respect to the uniform measure.
In this section, we detail how to deal with these two aspects in practice.
Remark VII.1 (indifference point). Since the point
≈
0 is a geometrical singu-
larity, it is difficult to include it naturally in such a measure. If one wants to
take it into account, the easiest way is to draw it with a given probability and
to use some given measure over Um \ {
≈
0} in the other cases.
Notations VII.2 (orthogonal projection on H). We denote D0 the matrix of
the orthogonal projection on H:
D0 = Id− 1
m
J.
Proposition VII.3 (distances in the utility space). Let (−→u ,−→v ) ∈
(
Rm \ R−→1
)2
.
Then, in the sense of metric λξ0 of theorem VI.5, the distance between
≈
u and ≈v
is:
d(
≈
u,
≈
v) = λ arccos
〈
D0
−→u
‖D0−→u ‖
∣∣∣∣ D0−→v‖D0−→v ‖
〉
.
Proof. First of all, we compute the projection
−→
u′ of −→u on H: we get −→u′ = D0−→u .
Then we normalize
−→
u′ in order to get it on the unit sphere of H, that is, −→u′′ =
1
‖−→u′‖
−→
u′ . We compute
−→
v′′ from −→v in a similar way.
Now, we just have to compute the distance between
−→
u′′ and
−→
v′′ on the surface
of the unit sphere and to multiply by λ: we get d(≈u, ≈v) = λ arccos〈−→u′′ | −→v′′ 〉.
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Remark VII.4 (utilities have no absolute meaning). Hence, for any point
≈
u in the utility space, we use a canonical representative belonging to H and
whose Euclidean norm is equal to 1. For example, we might have the following
representatives: { −→u = (0.71,−0.71, 0) ,−→v = (0.82,−0.41,−0.41) .
Since v1 > u1, does it mean that an agent with preferences
≈
v “appreciates”
candidate 1 more than an agent with preferences ≈u? We don’t say anything
like this: it is well known that utilities belonging to two agents are essentially
incomparable: see Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). Taking canonical
representatives on the (m− 2)-dimensional sphere is only used to compute dis-
tances between two points in the utility space.
Regarding the other question considered in this section, how to draw vectors
according to a uniform probability law over Um \ {
≈
0}, it is sufficient to use a
uniform law on the unit sphere in H.
To conclude about this spherical representation, here is an example of a
law defined by its density. Given a vector −→u0 in the unit sphere of H and κ
a nonnegative real number, the Von Mises–Fisher distribution of pole −→u0 and
concentration κ is defined by the following density with respect to the uniform
law on the unit sphere in H:
p(−→u ) = Cκeκ〈−→u | −→u0 〉,
where Cκ is a normalization constant.
It can be proved that, given the mean resultant vector of a distribution
over the sphere, Von Mises–Fisher distribution maximizes the entropy, in the
same way that, in the Euclidean space, Gaussian distribution maximizes the
entropy among laws with given mean and standard deviation. Hence, without
additional information, it is the “natural” distribution that should be used. In
order to draw data according to this law for simulation purposes, one may use
Ulrich algorithm modified by Wood: see Ulrich (1984) and Wood (1994).
VIII Conclusion
We have studied the geometrical properties of the classical model of expected
utilities, introduced by Von Neumann and Morgenstern, when candidates are
considered symmetrical a priori. We have remarked that the utility space may
be seen as a dual of the space of lotteries, that inversion and summation opera-
tors inherited from Rm have a natural interpretation in terms of preferences and
that the space has a spherical topology when the indifference point is removed.
We have proved that the only Riemannian representation that respects the
projective lines naturally defined by the summation operator and the symmetry
between candidates is a round sphere.
All these considerations lay on the principle to add as little information as
possible in the system, especially by respecting the a priori symmetry between
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candidates. This does not imply that the spherical representation of the utility
space Um is the most relevant one in order to study a specific situation. Indeed,
as soon as one has additional information (for example, a model that places
candidates in a political spectrum), it is natural to include it in the model.
However, if one wishes, for example, to study a voting system in all generality,
without focusing on its application in a specific field, it looks natural to consider
a utility space with a metric as neutral as possible, like the one defined in this
paper by the spherical representation.
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Notations
Non-alphabetical symbols
[α, β[ Real interval from α (included) to β (excluded).Jj, kK Integer interval from j to k (both included).
−→
1 Vector whose m coordinates are 1.
−−→
LM ∈ T Bipoint (M1 − L1, . . . ,Mm − Lm) from L ∈ Lm to M ∈ Lm.
〈−→u | −→v 〉 Canonical inner product of −→u and −→v .
‖−→u ‖ Canonical Euclidean norm of −→u .
- Binary relation representing an agent’s preferences over Lm.
≺ Strict relation associated to -.
-≈
u
Preferences over Lm represented by utility vector ≈u.
−→u ≈ −→v Vectors
−→u and −→v in Rm are two utility vectors representing
the same preferences over Lm.
Greek alphabet
λ ∈ R A real number.
ξ0
Metric on Um \ {
≈
0} induced by the canonical inner product on
Rm.
≈
pi(−→u ) Equivalence class of
−→u in the sense of ≈. Function ≈pi : Rm →
Um is called canonical projection (quotient).
Latin alphabet
a ∈ ]0,+∞[ Multiplicative normalization coefficient for the utilities of anagent.
b ∈ R Additive normalization coefficient for the utilities of an agent.
Cm Set J1,mK of candidates.
H Tangent hyperplane of Lm, that is, orthogonal to −→1 .
H? Dual space of the hyperplane H.
J Matrix of size m×m whose m2 coefficients are 1.
Lm Set of lotteries over the candidates: {(L1, . . . , Lm) ∈R+m t.q.
∑m
j=1 Lj = 1}.
m ∈ N \ {0} Number of candidates.
T Tangent polytope {−−→LM, (L,M) ∈ Lm2} of Lm.
Um Utility space Rm/ ≈.−→u ∈ Rm A utility vector (u1, . . . , um).
≈
u ∈ Um A utility vector (up to equivalence ≈).−→u +H Positive half-hyperplane associated to −→u .
vect(E) Linear span of E, where E is a part of a vector space.
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